Magic Formula Investing
Joel Greenblatt’s “
magic formula” investing chooses stocks
based on a combination of their relative cheapness, in terms of earnings yield
(more specifically, EBIT/EV), and quality, as measured by return on capital. To
be fair, he was not specific about the time horizon that he used to calculate
the two metrics. He also excluded such sectors as financials, insurances, telcos,
and utilities from his investable universe mainly due to concerns about the meaningfulness
of modern-day accounting in those sectors. In addition, he appeared to reject
the idea of applying the framework in a long and short portfolio construction.
In the below, I try to explain
1)
the economic intuition behind this “magic
formula” approach,
2)
its relevance in the context of low-risk
investing, and
3)
the difficulties of applying the framework in a
long and short portfolio construction.
Economic intuition
1)
Greenblatt’s combined method has been demonstrated
to outperform broad-market indices over a multi-year holding period.
§
In contrast, an investment strategy based on
earnings yield or return on capital alone hasn’t been able to produce historically
consistent returns.
2)
A long stock portfolio constructed by
Greenblatt’s tends to have a fairly high degree of stability. Roughly 40-50%
names will be carried over on a year-to-year basis
.
3)
The “low” turnover seems to manifest what Robert
K Merton called “Matthew Effect”
.
§
i.e. stocks that had high return on capital and
still looked appealing in terms of earnings yield tended to be winners in terms
of investor returns, while stocks that had inferior return on capital but were
priced relatively expensive tended to be the losers in terms of investor
returns.
4)
Greenblatt’s combined method is not backward
looking per se.
§
Earnings yield expresses a listed company’s
valuation by capitalising accounting-based figures, hence incorporating the
market’s expectation;
§
Return on capital uses historical accounting
data to capture the economic return for the company.
5)
Investors may have systematically over-estimated
the forces of competitive equilibrium
.
§
The real world is characterised by oligopolistic
competition, rather than perfect competition;
§
Investors, therefore, over time fail to
appreciate how costly and time-consuming it is for competitors to wrest
competitive advantage away from high-return companies due to factors such as
industry structure, brand recognition, entry-barrier, scale of economy, and
etc.
6)
Persistent, above-capital-cost corporate
profitability can be identified a priori.
The trailing Return on Capital, based on modern-day accounting, is one of such
indicators, albeit imperfect.
§
Holding stocks with higher Returns on Capital at
suitable valuation multiples is to capture the pass-through of high quality
corporate earnings to investors at reasonable prices.
Relations with low-risk investing
1)
As low-risk investing techniques
gain wider acceptance in recent years, various theories have been put forward
to explain the “low volatility anomaly”, i.e. why the market overpays for higher-beta
stocks. Two of them are worthy of noting
§
“Lottery Effect” - investors will overpay for a few risky stocks
which are perceived to be similar to lottery tickets;
§
“Leverage Aversion” – Some market participants
who are unable or unwilling to use leverage will choose to overweight riskier
assets to gain higher returns and bid up the prices of riskier assets. Thus, an
investor who is less leverage averse/constrained can benefit by overweighting
low-beta assets.
2)
The idea of “markets under-paying quality”
embodied in Greenblatt’s method provides some insights into the “low volatility
anomaly”
§
Greenblatt is essentially arguing that
beta/volatility, measured in stock price movement, is not a good ex-ante indicator
of forward absolute risk for it is befuddled with market participants’
behavioural bias or active management constraints.
§
A better one can be found in the study of
corporate profitability. Using such measures allow for controlling the real
risk of the underlying business and therefore result in low and stable “price
risk”.
3)
Said differently, Return on Capital approximates
the “fundamental beta” of a stock (in an inverse and non-linear way)
,
in contrast to the share-price movement-based “price beta”
Limitations in a long-short portfolio construction
1)
Following Greenblatt’s technique to construct a
long and a short leg, we can observe some distinct characteristics between the
two legs.
§
By definition, the short leg scores low in P/B
or EV/IC (mathematically speaking, low RoIC -> low EV/IC ~ low P/B), and
tends to be smaller market capitalised.
§
Compared to the long names, the short names will
cluster around sectors that are highly competitive, with low entry barriers,
for example, steel-making, cements, IT service companies, volume car
manufacturers, and airlines.
§
The short leg also demonstrates an even higher
degree of stickiness than the long leg, with more than 80% names carried over
y-o-y.
2)
The volatilities of the long and the short legs
are, therefore, asymmetric by nature.
§
The correlation between the long and the short
leg is in particularly weak in the first phase of “bull” rally after a severe
market collapse.
§
It is not incidental that Greenblatt’s investing
tends to under-perform the market during this phase of a stock market cycle,
when investors would seek relative performance, thus bidding up so-called low
price/book (or value) stocks.
3)
A period of under-performance, caused by the P/B
effect, is tolerable if its occurrence is once in every 6 to 7 years (i.e. a
“normal” stock market cycle).
4)
It has not been the case since 2008. Thanks to
the central banks’ over-activities, the stock market cycles have shortened to
less than one year.
§
Three price/book rallies ever since: post-March
2009 (QE1), post-August 2010 (QE2), and post-November 2011 (Operation Twist and
LTRO). This proved very damaging to the short leg of the strategy.
§
Central banks’ intervention prevents the 60 year
flood. There have been no widespread bankruptcies. Cats bounce before even
dead! In 1929-33, 20% of all companies went bankrupt, majority of which are
small “cheap stocks” with low price/book ratios.
5)
As corporate profitability quickly recovered
between 2009 and 2010, trailing Return on Capital may also become a less
reliable indicator of “true”/”sustainable” corporate profitability.
§
Examples are German premium car manufacturers
and European truck manufacturers. All of them suffered heavy losses in 2009,
but became phenomenally profitable in 2010 due to huge demand from China/Emerging
markets and the inventory restocking effect. But is the low twenty-ish RoC in
2010 a good forward indicator? Historically, they are average RoC companies.
The “Matthew Effect” takes its name from Gospel of
St. Matthew: “For unto everyone that hath shall be given, and he shall have
abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he
hath.” In other words, it is about “accumulative advantage”.