Thursday, 27 September 2012

No more heavenly manna from China



So much hope is now placed on China. Recently I have met quite a few senior managers from large European corporations. They all seemed to cherish the same thought that China will be a world saviour again when the new leadership takes its form in the coming month. There will be no more dithering. A repeat of 2009-2010 fixed asset investment frenzy will come soon.

It is probably a wishful thinking, I am afraid.
1)      More fixed asset investment boom means more corruption. The chain of cause and effect cannot be more clearly illustrated in the bouts of unrests protesting illicit land grabbing by local governments in collusion with developers.
2)      Everyone knows that more boozes cannot help get over a hangover. Since the next generation (the fifth) of the Communist collective leadership will stay in power for next ten years (2x five-year terms), they cannot use more stimulus to buy time – if there is an ugly eventuality, it more likely than not falls when they are still in power (lucky for European politicians!). 

Thursday, 9 August 2012

Is Europe Really Cheap ? - My Answers


I managed to find time in the afteroon to get back to the topic.

The starting point is March 2009 at which the global equities bottomed out. Here are the accumulated returns, up to today (09/08/12), for each of S&P 500 (SPX), DJ STOXX Europe 600 (SXXP), DJ Euro STOXX 600 (SXXE)[1] in its respective currency.   




Total Return
31/03/09 to 09/08/12
vs SPX
SPX
78%
--
SXXP
59%
-19%
SXXE
39%
-39%


Should Financials/Banks/Insurances/Real Estates be excluded, 




Total Return
31/03/09 to 09/08/12
vs SPX ex Fin
SPX ex Fin
82%
--
SXXP ex Fin
70%
-13%
SXXE ex Fin
47%
-35%

It is clear
  • Financials/Banks/Insurances/Real Estates played a significant part in Europe’s under-performance vs the US
  • Eurozone is more stressed.

The relative performance shown above hasn’t yet answered the question – Is Europe valuation distressed?

I tried a few methods to come up a straightforward yes-or-no but to no avail. The main problem is the availability of good-quality data (or lack of them rather). Most European countries’ pre-2000 data are hard to come by. Key series, such as profit margins and revenue growth, are non-existent. 

An alternative way is to use Bob Shiller’s S&P CAPEdata. Assuming both US and Europe markets were valued around the same magnitude,


SPX
Shiller’s CAPE
31/03/2009
787.5
13.32x
09/08/2012
1,400
21.76x



Post-war Average

18.3x
Post war, excl Jan 1998 to Dec 2007, Average

16.1x
Jan 1982 till now, Average[2]

22.0x

My personal comfort level for S&P 500 is around 18x for CAPE. To put in another way, today’s S&P is about 20% over-bought. This means
  • Non-Euro developed Europe is probably fairly valued
  • Euro 12 countries are under-valued somewhere 15%-20%. More so with S Europe countries but less so with N Europe.

You may have noticed,  in reaching these conclusions, I have implicitly assumed that no permanent damage had been done to the capital/human stock in Europe/Eurozone since 2008. This may turn out a big ask.

Update on 13/08

A recent commentary, When Bad Things Happen to Cheap Assets, by Ben Inker of GMO, also touched on the "cheapness" of European equities.
        



 


[1] STOXX Europe 600 (SXXP) covers developed European markets including none-eurozone countries, whilst EURO STOXX (SXXE) is limited to the 12 Eurozone countries. 
[2] Burton Malkiel called it “Age of Exuberance”…

Wednesday, 8 August 2012

Is Fraser & Neave Ltd (FNN) still a buy?


Some background info:

This is the latest episode of the land-grabbing among major breweries (see here and here).

It started with Thai Beverage and Kirin’s stake-building in Fraser & Neave Ltd (FNN), a Singapore conglomerate which also holds 39.70% -- 7.3% direct and 32.4% indrect via Asia Pacific Investment Ptd Ltd (APIPL), a JV between FNN and Heineken --  in Asia Pacific Brewery (APB).

Heineken’s hands were forced. On 20/07, it offered to pay S$50 per APB share to purchase the 39.70% APB stake from FNN plus S$163mn for Non-APB assets held by APIPL.

On 07/08, Kindest Place Group, an affiliate of Thai Beverage, counter-offered $55 per share for FNN’s 7.3% direct stake in APB.             

…

I did a quick sum-of-parts based on what I gather from FNN’s 31/03/12 quarterly report.
 S$mn
Frasers Commercial Trust (FCOT, SGX listed REIT, 23.20% owned) 
172
Frasers Centrepoint Trust (FCT, SGX listed REIT, 42.70% owned) [1]          
631
FCOT convertible perpetual units                                                                   
343
Investment properties (based on 31/03/12 quarterly)                                     
2,736
Development properties (based on 31/03/12 quarterly)                                  
4,427
Total, property portfolio                                                                                 
8,309

APB stake, based on latest S$55 offer[2][3]                                                        
5,638
Non-APB assets held by APIPL valued by Heineken[4]                                 
163

Fully consolidated soft drink and dairy business (i.e. 56.3% owned Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd and 100% non-listed Singapore Softdrink units)
            o/w Soft drink (rolling 12m ebit $35, 16x[5])                                       
560
            o/w Dairy (rolling 12m ebit S$37, 12x)                                              
444

Vietnam Diary (listed, 9.50% owned, market value)                                     
321
Myanmar Brewery (55% owned by FNN, not part of APB/APIPL portfolio, estimate)
430

Times publishing unit (rolling 12m ebit S$28mn, 4.5x[6])                                
126
Total, non-property portfolio                                                                           
7,682
Net debt                                                                                                          
2,640

Thereof, NAV                                                                                                
S$13,351

Number of FNN shares                                                          
1,420.5

NAV per share                                                                                                 
S$9.40

FNN 08/08/12 close price                                                                               
S$8.49

i.e. a 11% discount

Here is a look-across to Singapore Press Holdings Ltd (SPH), a conglomerate with a significant investment property portfolio.

Media & publishing business (Rolling 12m ebit S$1052, 4.5x)                     
4,734
Investment Properties (Market value, based on 30/05/12quarterly)             
2,674

Net Debt                                                                                                        
252
Thereof, NAV                                                                                                 
7,156

Number of SPH shares                                                          
1,595.5

NAV per share                                                                                                 
S$4.49

SPH 08/08/12 close price                                                                               
S$4.03

This also translates to a 10% discount.

10% doesn’t appear much, after allowing for some holding company discount. But if you bet on a bidding war for the APB stake and some latentinterests in FNN’s soft drink franchise, there may be still something left on the table. A word of caution, though, SoTP is a “bull-market” valuation method.





[1] FNN’s property arm acts as the manager for the two REITs. The annual management fees, combined, amount to around S$20mn. Presumably, FNN would lose the management fee stream should it dispose of the two REITS.
[2] Heineken will have to at least match the S$55 price for the FNN board has to put the offers to shareholders for a vote.
[3] APB is fully consolidated to FNN. It is almost debt free (about S$120 mn net debt as of 31 March 2012), thus no adjustment for debt in the above calculation
[4] Arguably, Heineken will have to pay more after the S$55 per share counter-bid from the Kindest Place Group
[5] Earnings are adjusted for the minority leakage in Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd. A take-out multiple will be much higher. FNN until 30/09/11 was the Coca-Cola bottler in Singapore/Malaysia.
[6] A relatively conservative multiple.

Tuesday, 31 July 2012

Is Europe Really Cheap?

A quick note.

Recently there are loud talks out there claiming that European equities have become very cheap, based on Bob Shiller's CAPE or other long-term cyclically adjusted metrics. An expected annualised return >10% in a 7/10-year investment horizon is often mentioned along the line.

I am yet fully convinced. European stocks in the capital goods/consumer staple sectors, for example, is not discounted to a notable extent to its American peers, say.

I suspect that after excluding financial, insurance, properties, and utilities (esp renewable-exposed), the remaining European names would not appear much cheap at all vs the U.S. peers.

I will come back on this topic after doing some digging.

Saturday, 28 July 2012

A Study on SKF

A Study on SKF


Svenska Kullagerfabriken AB (Swedish: Swedish ball bearing plant AB), or SKF, is a high quality Swedish machinery name. As its products are widely used across various industrial sectors, the company’s performance can sometimes give a feel of what the world economy will be like.

On its website, there is a wealth of company financial data going back to 1947.

I did some number crunching. Here are several charts to share[1].

Chart legends:
  • EV (enterprise value) = equity’s market value + net financial obligation
  • EBITDA= Earnings before financial interest, corporate taxes, and depreciation and amortisation
  • EBIT= Earnings before financial interest and corporate taxes
  • RoIC = Return on Invested Capital =EBIT/(PPE + Net Working Capital)
  • Net working capital = Trade receivables + Inventories – Trade payables
  • Inv Turns (inventory turns) = Revenue / Inventories
  • Rec Turns (receivable turns) = Revenue / Trade receivables
  • Pay Turns (payable turns) = Revenue / Trade payables
  • PPE Turns (PPE turns) = Revenue / PPE

There are several observations I found interesting

  1. Profitability plays a dominate role in valuation. Peaking margins lead to a multiple compression while bottoming margins do the other way around

  1. Current valuation is not expensive, nor is very cheap from a long cycle perspective.[2]


  1. The last decade, in terms of profitability, is truly exceptional.

    • The step-up is mainly attributable to the “narrowing” of the gap between the gross margin and the EBIT/EBITDA margin as the former stayed relatively flat. Viewed differently, above the gross margin line costs tend to be variable while below there are fixed or semi-fixed costs such as SG&A, R&D, and etc. The strong revenue growth in the last decade has allowed the company to make hay of the fixed cost operating leverage.

  1. Profitability, measured by RoIC, is even more pronounced, i.e. the company has become very good in utilising its capital

    • Inventory and PPE turns are the drivers behind the surge in asset turns. Think about just-in-time order-inventory management, parts manufacturing outsourcing, SAP system…

  1. Last but not the least, profits do tend to reverse. The charts below clearly show that a higher earning resulted in a slower earning growth in the following cycle. 
 








[1] SKF share price is of the Class B share. Market capitalisation (MCap)/value incorporates both share classes (A & B). The MCap data between 1982 and 2000 are based on the Class B share prices (Source: Worldscope), assuming a given ratio of the number of shares issued between Class B and Class A.
[2] Bob Shiller’s cycleadjusted P/E (CAPE) or Andrew Smithers’s Q ratio does a decent job of anchoring the stock market valuation in a long time frame. Admittedly, such metrics do not work well on the individual stock level.

Thursday, 26 July 2012

Musing on Greenblatt’s model


Magic Formula Investing


Joel Greenblatt’s “magic formula” investing chooses stocks based on a combination of their relative cheapness, in terms of earnings yield (more specifically, EBIT/EV), and quality, as measured by return on capital. To be fair, he was not specific about the time horizon that he used to calculate the two metrics. He also excluded such sectors as financials, insurances, telcos, and utilities from his investable universe mainly due to concerns about the meaningfulness of modern-day accounting in those sectors. In addition, he appeared to reject the idea of applying the framework in a long and short portfolio construction.

In the below, I try to explain

1)      the economic intuition behind this “magic formula” approach,
2)      its relevance in the context of low-risk investing, and
3)      the difficulties of applying the framework in a long and short portfolio construction.

Economic intuition


1)      Greenblatt’s combined method has been demonstrated to outperform broad-market indices over a multi-year holding period.
§         In contrast, an investment strategy based on earnings yield or return on capital alone hasn’t been able to produce historically consistent returns.

2)      A long stock portfolio constructed by Greenblatt’s tends to have a fairly high degree of stability. Roughly 40-50% names will be carried over on a year-to-year basis[1].

3)      The “low” turnover seems to manifest what Robert K Merton called “Matthew Effect”[2].
§         i.e. stocks that had high return on capital and still looked appealing in terms of earnings yield tended to be winners in terms of investor returns, while stocks that had inferior return on capital but were priced relatively expensive tended to be the losers in terms of investor returns.

4)      Greenblatt’s combined method is not backward looking per se.
§         Earnings yield expresses a listed company’s valuation by capitalising accounting-based figures, hence incorporating the market’s expectation;
§         Return on capital uses historical accounting data to capture the economic return for the company.

5)      Investors may have systematically over-estimated the forces of competitive equilibrium[3].
§         The real world is characterised by oligopolistic competition, rather than perfect competition;
§         Investors, therefore, over time fail to appreciate how costly and time-consuming it is for competitors to wrest competitive advantage away from high-return companies due to factors such as industry structure, brand recognition, entry-barrier, scale of economy, and etc.[4]

6)      Persistent, above-capital-cost corporate profitability can be identified a priori. The trailing Return on Capital, based on modern-day accounting, is one of such indicators, albeit imperfect.
§         Holding stocks with higher Returns on Capital at suitable valuation multiples is to capture the pass-through of high quality corporate earnings to investors at reasonable prices.

Relations with low-risk investing


1)      As low-risk investing techniques[5] gain wider acceptance in recent years, various theories have been put forward to explain the “low volatility anomaly”, i.e. why the market overpays for higher-beta stocks. Two of them are worthy of noting
§         “Lottery Effect” -  investors will overpay for a few risky stocks which are perceived to be similar to lottery tickets;
§         “Leverage Aversion” – Some market participants who are unable or unwilling to use leverage will choose to overweight riskier assets to gain higher returns and bid up the prices of riskier assets. Thus, an investor who is less leverage averse/constrained can benefit by overweighting low-beta assets.

2)      The idea of “markets under-paying quality” embodied in Greenblatt’s method provides some insights into the “low volatility anomaly”
§         Greenblatt is essentially arguing that beta/volatility, measured in stock price movement, is not a good ex-ante indicator of forward absolute risk for it is befuddled with market participants’ behavioural bias or active management constraints.
§         A better one can be found in the study of corporate profitability. Using such measures allow for controlling the real risk of the underlying business and therefore result in low and stable “price risk”.

3)      Said differently, Return on Capital approximates the “fundamental beta” of a stock (in an inverse and non-linear way)[6], in contrast to the share-price movement-based “price beta”

Limitations in a long-short portfolio construction


1)      Following Greenblatt’s technique to construct a long and a short leg, we can observe some distinct characteristics between the two legs.
§         By definition, the short leg scores low in P/B or EV/IC (mathematically speaking, low RoIC -> low EV/IC ~ low P/B), and tends to be smaller market capitalised.
§         Compared to the long names, the short names will cluster around sectors that are highly competitive, with low entry barriers, for example, steel-making, cements, IT service companies, volume car manufacturers, and airlines.
§         The short leg also demonstrates an even higher degree of stickiness than the long leg, with more than 80% names carried over y-o-y.

2)      The volatilities of the long and the short legs are, therefore, asymmetric by nature.
§         The correlation between the long and the short leg is in particularly weak in the first phase of “bull” rally after a severe market collapse.
§         It is not incidental that Greenblatt’s investing tends to under-perform the market during this phase of a stock market cycle, when investors would seek relative performance, thus bidding up so-called low price/book (or value) stocks.

3)      A period of under-performance, caused by the P/B effect, is tolerable if its occurrence is once in every 6 to 7 years (i.e. a “normal” stock market cycle).[7]

4)      It has not been the case since 2008. Thanks to the central banks’ over-activities, the stock market cycles have shortened to less than one year.
§         Three price/book rallies ever since: post-March 2009 (QE1), post-August 2010 (QE2), and post-November 2011 (Operation Twist and LTRO). This proved very damaging to the short leg of the strategy.
§         Central banks’ intervention prevents the 60 year flood. There have been no widespread bankruptcies. Cats bounce before even dead! In 1929-33, 20% of all companies went bankrupt, majority of which are small “cheap stocks” with low price/book ratios.

5)      As corporate profitability quickly recovered between 2009 and 2010, trailing Return on Capital may also become a less reliable indicator of “true”/”sustainable” corporate profitability.
§         Examples are German premium car manufacturers and European truck manufacturers. All of them suffered heavy losses in 2009, but became phenomenally profitable in 2010 due to huge demand from China/Emerging markets and the inventory restocking effect. But is the low twenty-ish RoC in 2010 a good forward indicator? Historically, they are average RoC companies.


[1] More than 90% names would remain unchanged year on year if calculations are based on averages, or minimums.
[2] The “Matthew Effect” takes its name from Gospel of St. Matthew: “For unto everyone that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.” In other words, it is about “accumulative advantage”.
 [3] Classic micro-economic theory suggests that businesses generating excess returns will attract competition, driving the returns down to the cost of capital over time and perhaps below it for a period. Inversely, low return businesses should expect competitors leave the scene, allowing for the return to rise to the cost of capital and perhaps above it for a period. A perpetually money-losing enterprise would face a Darwinian demise
[4] Concepts such as “corporate moats” by Warran Buffet, and “Competitive Advantage Period (CAP)” by Michael Mauboussin describe the oligopolistic form of the market structure.
[5] Typical low risk portfolio construction techniques are Inverse Volatility (IV) or Risk-Parity (RP) which allocates the same volatility budge to each stock in the universe, effectively over-weighting low volatility stocks, and vice versa; Minimum Variance (MV), which is the output from an optimisation process where investors solve for the portfolio which minimise the ex-ante volatility; Maximum Diversification (MD), which results from an optimisation process where investors solve for the portfolio which maximises the ratio of the weighted average volatilities of the stocks divided by the volatility of the portfolio.
[6] It will also need to account for factors such as stability of RoCs and margin over cost of capital.
[7] As short-leg names are smaller market capitalised and more sticky, there are limitations in daily liquidity and short borrowing availably too.